intellectual property rights are justified only by the need to overcome fail ures of the market economy in producing creative works; unauthorised uses are prohibited only to die extent necessary to promote the correction of market failure and the efficient production of intellectual works. (Hadfield, 1992:5) Given that copyright protection is a legislative grant of market power, it is ap propriate to analyse the regulation of collecting societies in accordance with the framework agreed to by the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments in clause 5(1) of die Compeddon Principles Agreement (COAG, 1995) :
The guiding principle is diat legislation ... should not restrict compeddon unless it can be demonstrated diat: (a) die benefits of die restriedon to the community as a whole outweigh the costs; and (b) die objeedves of die legisladon can only be achieved by restriedng compeddon.
This places die burden on diose who benefit from die legisladve grant of market power inherent in copyright to demonstrate diat such power is in die public interest.
Concerns about Collective Licensing
In many cases, individual licensing of copyright is impossible because of die high monitoring and transacdon costs involved. The distribudon of copyrighted material worldwide often makes it impossible for ardsts to detect breaches of dieir copyright. Similarly, die costs become excessive if ardsts have to negodate widi many potential users. Copyright collecting societies have developed as a modern means to over come these problems.1 Six such societies exist in Australia.
Businesses have expressed two kinds of concern to die HRSCLCA (1997b). The first, and die more common, is alleged double-dipping by audiors: for exam ple, a singer or a song-writer who has already received royalties from a radio station may be reimbursed again when a shop owner listens to die performance over die radio. The second concern is diat, aldiough a licence may be justified, its price may be excessive.
The first concern has no weight as a matter of law, and litde weight as a matter of policy. So-called double-dipping can be justified as a risk-sharing mechanism diat aids die dissemination of copyrighted material. By providing audiors widi rights at multiple stages (for example, when a compact disc is sold to a radio station, and when it is played over die radio) die Copyright Act enables audiors to share die risks by lowering the price of the initial sale licence (hence encouraging uptake), and then earning income later. The second concern, however, is more serious. It arises because copyright collecting societies employ actual or potential anti-competitive means to achieve their objectives. Copyright collecting societies bring together par ties who w'ould normally be competitors. This enables creators to discourage users from purchasing other material (tying), and to jointly determine prices for the copy right material (price-fixing) (Treasury, 1996:63) .
This anti-competitive conduct raises the price of the work above that which would odierwise be charged and, as a corollary7 , results in a decrease in use oi die copyrighted work. As copyright material has value only to the extent to which it is used, die broader diffusion and use of intellectual property adds value widiout adding significandy to costs. The collecting societies' restriction of die diffusion and use of intellectual property goes some way towards explaining why low-quality ma terial ('elevator music' or 'muzak') is used in locadons where use of original material may be preferred.
In addition, some collective licensing practices, particularly die licensing of all an audior's rights to one person or organisation ('blanket licences'), discourage di rect commissioning of works. While die majority of individually commissioned works in Australia are created by Australians, collectively licensed material is mostly foreign. Thus, regulation to restrict blanket licences should encourage die use of material created by Australians.
How Collecting Societies Operate
From the perspective of copyright owners, die current system of collecting societies appears quite reasonable. The six collecdng sociedes are broadly aligned widi die different classes of right holders; for example, the Phonographic Performance Company of Australia licenses die broadcasting and public performance of sound recordings owned by record companies, while die Copyright Agency Limited pro vides licences widi respect to educational copying and journalists' rights. The Simp son Report on die operations of collecdng sociedes clearly endorsed diis logic and found no evidence diat die number of sociedes should be reduced (Simpson, 1995:secdon 2.6) .
From die user's perspective, however, die number and diversity of collecdng sociedes appear slighdy less practical. O f particular concern is die relative prolif eration of collecting societies diat license different rights for different purposes; in deed, Australia appears to have more collecting societies than any odier Western country (Lester & Faulder, 1989:108) . This means diat a business diat requires more dian one licence is likely to have to approach more dian one collecting soci ety; cooperation between collecting societies remains limited and die one-stop-shop is not a real option. International practices demonstrate diat such a fragmented system is not necessary (Matsuoka, 1989:50) . The multiplicity of societies appears to create significant complexity for non-intensive users of copyright (such as the majority of small businesses), even diough die principal rationale of copyright col-lecting societies is that they reduce transaction costs for both copyright owners and users.
A solution to this problem is to reduce the points of contact that a small busi ness must deal with in respect of copyright licensing. This can be achieved by regulating to encourage die emergence of competing 'one-stop-shop' collecting societies. Again, international evidence suggests that this proposal is feasible (ACCC, 1996:26) . The Simpson Report, however, is scathing of such a sugges tion:
Given the frequcndy expressed concern about die power of sociedes, it is perhaps surprising diat diere is also a frequendy expressed opinion dia: diere are too many sociedes and diat diey would achieve greater efficiency by amalgamadng and sharing administradve expenses. The views are in di rect conflict. ... there is probably litde cost advantage in die amalgamadon of the exisdng sociedes. Radier, it is recommended that diere be a muldplicity of sociedes so diat individual sociedes can represent die disparate in terests of the separate groups of rights owners. This is more likely to en sure die equitable representadon of members' rights and promote a compeddve environment. (Simpson, 1995 : secdon 2.6)
Simpson's cridcism is misdirected. Simpson makes die common mistake of assum ing diat because copyright provides market power to encourage die production of die work, such power should also be provided to facilitate die distribution cf the copyright. As the Hilmer Report noted, it is important to limit die existence of market power solely to those elements where it is necessary, and introduce conpeddon at every odier stage (Hilmer, 1993:193) .
While it is necessary to provide some form of market power to address die underproduedon of creadve works diat would occur widiout copyright protecdon, diere is no compelling reason to sanedon market power over die distribudon of die copyrighted works. Figure 1 demonstrates die social benefits from die introduedon of protecdon dirough die legisladve grant of market power in die form of copyright, and die subsequent benefit of ensuring diat compeddon exists in distribudon of the copyrighted work.
Widiout die copyright protecdon provided by a legisladve grant of market power, only QO of copyrighted works would be created by audiors (ORR, 1995:13-15, 43-50) . While some of QO may be sold at reladvely high prices, die public's ability to copy die work means diat there may only be a single (or at least very few) sales because the remaining consumers have an incendve, absent any intellectual property, technological or contractual protecdon, to produce (Q* minus QO) copies and pay nodiing to the audiors in return.
Once copyright protecdon is granted, each person has a monopoly right over his or her own work, but competes in a broader market of copyrighted maerial. The grant of copyright protecdon permits die audiors to stop users free-riding, and hence a market is created. As a result, Q1 copies of the good are sold and pro duced at PI.
If the formation of a copyright collecting society results in an effective monop oly over distribution, the result will be increased prices and a restriction in distribu tion. In Figure 1 the introduction of monopoly results in the number of works sold falling from Q1 to Q2, while consumers are forced to pay more (P2 minus PI). This has two principal effects. First, there is a transfer to the collecting society (and hence the authors) from consumers equal to (P2 minus PI) multiplied by Q2. Sec ond, there is a welfare loss to society because some consumers who value the work above what they would have paid in a competitive market (PI) do not value the work sufficiently to purchase it at the monopoly price (P2). This results in a welfare loss equivalent to the shaded triangle. Figure 1 demonstrates that there are social benefits to encouraging competition in the distribution of copyrighted works, and as a corol lary, there are costs in allowing copyright collecting societies to operate as monopo lies in the distribution of copyrighted material.
Defects of the Present Regulatory Regime
The Copyright Tribunal sets copyright licence fees. Under the Copyright Act 1968, the Copyright Tribunal has the power to hear disputes about terms and conditions of licences or licence schemes administered by collecting societies. Licensors, li censees and persons desiring a licence may refer disputes to the Tribunal for de termination.2 In this way:
The Copyright Tribunal is an arbitrator. It arbitrates disputes concerning the amounts which should be paid by way of reasonable or equitable remu neration under licences granted, or to be granted, sometimes by statute, for the use of copyright material. (Shepherd, 1995:1) The Tribunal has been used in such a manner only 14 times since 1968 (ACCC, 1996:8) , presumably because the proceedings are thought to be expensive, slow and unnecessarily legalistic (Simpson, 1995:254) .
The anti-competitive behaviour of collecting societies is regulated by the Aus tralian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) under the Trade Prac tices Act (TPA). The TPA attempts to accommodate the different emphases adopted by intellectual property laws and competition policy. Sub-section 51(1) states that anti-competitive conduct permitted under intellectual property legislation is subject to the TPA. This blanket coverage is subject to sub-section 51(3), which provides an exception to the prohibitions contained in Part IV, except for sections 46 and 46A (misuse of market power) and 48 (resale price maintenance).3 Signifi cantly, however, the ACCC has the power to authorise otherwise anti-competitive conduct where the anti-competitive effect is outweighed by die public benefit (sub section 90(6)).4
This dual enforcement approach is limited in two fundamental respects. First, die Tribunal is purely reactive. It relies on parties to bring disputes brought before it (which happens often after many years of protracted and expensive negotiation), and does not have any powers to regulate to avoid disputes.5 Second, the Tribunal does not examine the anti-competitive or public interest effects of any licensing ar rangement.6
The separation of die price-setting function from an explicit assessment of competition in die market, particularly when die market's existence is made feasible only by die legislative grant of market power, is inconsistent widi die treatment of firms in odier industries which enjoy significant market power. For example, such firms are often regulated in a manner diat combines die price-setting function widi consideration of actual or potential anti-competitive conduct. Examples include prices surveillance under die Prices Surveillance Act 1983 and industry-specific ac cess/pricing regulation.
Overcoming the Inadequacies of the Law
Some options for overcoming diese inadequacies are explored below.
Extending the Tribunal' s power to regulate collecting societies. One option is to expand, and in die process clarify, the jurisdiction of the Copyright Tribunal.
I he first step would be to change die Tribunal's reach and fundamental ap proach. Its reach can be extended by providing it widi an arbitration role, and its foe us extended to incorporate a specific public-benefit type7 or compeddon-related Lest (eidier in conjunction widi, or in place of, die current 'reasonableness' test).
Care needs to be taken to ensure diat any such extension of die Tribunal's ju risdiedon is effeedve and does not create new distortions. For example, compulsory supervision and arbitration would be prohibitively expensive for many small partici pants.
I dtential problems associated widi die expansion of die Tribunal's role can be minimised by die establishment of a set of principles to ensure that licensing ar rangements are used to furdier anti-competitive ends. Such a set of guidelines has been suggested by Lupton and Dralios (1996:12) :
• the licensing scheme must be die least restrictive possible;
• die arrangements should not discourage direct dealings between creator and user;
• die fee should accord widi die amount of material used;
• if blanket licences are necessary, diey must have carve-out provisions, which provides a mechanism for audiors to have control over selected works radier dian giving absolute audionty to collecting societies. While some of these elements have been unilaterally adopted by societies, and others required by the ACCC in the context of authorisations, a more transparent process would be ensured if they were incorporated in legislation.
Given that the United States has a broadly similar scheme to that advocated above (ACCC, 1996:29-30, 85; Schlesinger, 1989:85) , it would be difficult, although not impossible, for it to oppose the introduction of such a scheme. Equally, such an approach appears to be consistent with clause 2 of Article 40 of the international TRIPs Agreement (1994):
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their national legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse ef fect on competition in the relevant market. As provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, ap propriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing chal lenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member.
Reforming the Tribunal's price-selling function. The Tribunal's approach to pricing has been relatively controversial (Court, 1987:368-72) .
The task facing the Tribunal is far from easy. A former President of the Tri bunal, Justice Shepherd, has described the process of determining a price, particu larly when employing the 'notional bargaining approach',8 in these terms: The Tribunal's task is one of evaluation or estimation. .. .The starting point will be a search for a market. If there is a market, probably the market value will be the value which prevails. If there is no market, or if the object ... is not well sought after so that comparable sales are not easily found, the court will have to construct or endeavour to construct, a notional buyer. This becomes a much more theoretical exercise. It involves a degree of subjective judgement and minds will often differ as to what the appropriate outcome is.
The Copyright Tribunal is almost invariably faced with a task of this kind. It is un likely diat there will be a market for a particular right which is involved. If there is not, die Tribunal usually tries the 'notional bargaining approach', constructing, as best it can from the available material, the factors and considerations which it con-siders die parties themselves would consider if they were entering into such a bar gain (Shepherd, 1995:8-9) .
Concern has been expressed that the Tribunal has at times been inconsistent in administering this approach, vacillating between setting prices based on use and prices based on compensation for forgone sales (Court, 1987:368) .
While the Tribunal's decisions are acknowledged to be value judgments,9 there is a clear appreciation of die economic forces of supply and demand substitudon and cross-elasdcides:
In die background is die anxiety diat die figure, if too high and dius unfair, may operate adversely because it may paradoxically deny to die audiors the remuneradon s.53B intended diem to have and also deny to educadonal insdtudons die ability to use as wide a range of material as they should. All in all die task is a most difficult and responsible one.10
While diis passage implicidy acknowledges the importance of understanding economic forces (such as die cross-elasdcity of demand) when setdng licence fees, die Tribunal appears to lack the economic experdse to evaluate those forces ade quately.
An obvious answer to die Tribunal's inexperience at price setdng is to provide it some expert assistance. One soludon is to appoint the ACCC as an amicus curiae (a friend of die Tribunal) to assist die Tribunal widi die determinadon of die price. Anodier soludon is to abolish die Copyright Tribunal and vest its responsibilides widi die Australian Compeddon Tribunal. The benefit of this approach is three fold: die Australian Compeddon Tribunal has significant experience in dealing widi complex compeddon-related matters; it is experienced in dealing widi die ACCC as an amicus curiae}1 and it exposes copyright-related praedees to die scrudny of an organisadon diat is less susceptible to regulatory capture.
A case for temporary prices surveillance? Yet anodier opdon is to subject die collecdng societies to prices surveillance by die ACCC. The Industry Commission has proposed a simple test to determine when prices surveillance is an appropriate mechanism. It recommends diat surveillance should be limited to cases where a single firm has a greater dian two-diirds market share and has no major rival; and faces sporadic or trivial imports (import penetradon persistendy below ten per cent of die market); and is sheltered by substandal barriers to entry (including the ex pansion of rivals) (IC, 1994:80) .
In diis case, whedier price surveillance is appropriate for collecdng sociedes turns on die market definidon(s) adopted. While the ACCC (1996:66-7) has reached no firm opinion on die appropriate market definidon for collecdng socie- ties, its observations suggest that collecting societies satisfy the Industry Commis sion's checklist, and are hence suitable for prices surveillance.
Given that prices surveillance is a second-best policy measure, it may best be used a transitory policy measure until collecting societies have a more appropriate regulatory regime.
Concluding Comments
The concerns raised by small business regarding die collective exploitation of copy right should not be viewed as a problem that 'needs fixing'. Such an knee-jerk ap proach would result in (further) piecemeal amendment to die Copyright Act 1968, and possibly introduce new distortions in die process.
It may, however, be too late; in response to die concerns raised before die HRSCLCA, the Australian Performing Rights Associadon (APRA, 1997) has agreed to support legislative amendments to exempt radio listeners from any liabil ity for copyright licences. The exemption, however, asks diat die Copyright Tribu nal, in effect, pass die forgone royaldes on to radio broadcasters.
Policy-makers should view such business concerns as being charged for listen ing to die radio at work merely as a symptom of a much deeper problem. That problem is die inadequate reguladon of the market power granted to copyright owners and exploited by die collecüng sociedes (ACCC, 1996:1) . As diis article has demonstrated, diere is significant scope for improving die regulatory regime.
While die Nadonal Compeddon Policy reform process has focused on mo nopoly power and access issues in major infrastructure industries, it appears to have overlooked the same issues widi respect to intellectual property. It is dme to subject intellectual property, a major input in an on-line informadon-based economy, to similarly rigorous analysis.
